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1 
DIRECT SHIPMENT OF WINE, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
AND THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR 
LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Lloyd C. Anderson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many states prohibit out-of-state sellers of wine from shipping their 
product directly to consumers, but permit in-state wine producers to 
engage in such direct shipment.1  Recent lower federal court decisions 
have cast serious constitutional doubt upon the authority of a state to 
discriminate in this manner against wine producers and sellers from 
other states in favor of its own domestic wine industry.2  This issue 
appears headed for the Supreme Court of the United States in the near 
future.3  The outcome cannot be foreseen with certainty, but it is likely 
the Court will find this discrimination unconstitutional.4 
‘Twas not always so.  Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution in 1933 ended the era of nationwide Prohibition 
of the production, sale and transportation of alcoholic beverages in this 
 
*   C. Blake McDowell, Jr. Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law.  The 
efforts of my research assistant, Christopher Curtin, were stellar.  The views expressed in this article 
are my own.  Financial support was provided by a Summer Research Fellowship of the School of 
Law. 
 1. See Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-
first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce in 
Alcoholic Beverage, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1648-51 (2000) (reviewing the various state laws 
regulating or prohibiting direct shipment). 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 143-215. 
 3. See infra text accompanying note 216 for a discussion of why the Supreme Court is likely 
to grant certiorari to review this issue. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 218-225 for a discussion of why discriminatory direct 
shipment laws are likely to be ruled unconstitutional.  See also Douglass, supra note 1; Vijay 
Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws: The Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-first 
Amendment, 85 VA. L. REV. 353 (1999); Russ Miller, Note, The Wine is in the Mail: The Twenty-
first Amendment and State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 2495 (2001) (arguing that discriminatory direct shipment laws are unconstitutional). 
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country.5  It also prohibited the import of alcohol into any state in 
violation of that state’s laws.6  For several decades after ratification, the 
U.S. Supreme Court afforded this provision a literal interpretation based 
upon its text and not subject to limitations imposed upon state authority 
by other constitutional provisions.7  Specifically, the Amendment was 
held to be “not limited by the commerce clause.”8  Under this view, 
although the Commerce Clause of the Constitution9 had long been 
construed as forbidding state discrimination against interstate commerce 
absent a compelling justification,10 this Amendment carved out a unique 
niche for alcohol: states had plenary authority to regulate imports of 
such products, regardless of the impact such regulation had on interstate 
commerce. 
The era of literalism ended when the Court decided that it was 
“patently bizarre” to conclude that the Twenty-first Amendment had 
“repealed” the Commerce Clause; to say that the Amendment was “not 
limited” by the Commerce Clause would be to say that Congress had lost 
its authority to regulate interstate commerce in alcohol, at least to the 
extent that Congress lacked power to regulate such commerce in ways 
that were inconsistent with state regulation.11 Instead, the Court adopted 
a new position that the two constitutional provisions should be read in 
harmony with each other, not in opposition to each other.  In order to 
reconcile the commands of the Twenty-first Amendment and the 
Commerce Clause, the Court fashioned a rule: state laws that 
discriminate against interstate commerce in alcohol are unconstitutional 
unless they are closely related to one of the powers reserved to the states 
by the Twenty-first Amendment.12 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.  The text of Sections one and two of the Twenty-first 
Amendment provides: 
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is 
hereby repealed. 
Section 2.  The transportation or importation into any State, Territory or possession of 
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the 
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. 
Id.  The term “alcohol” will be used in this Article to mean “alcoholic beverages,” for sake of 
brevity.  The term “alcohol,” as used in this Article, thus does not encompass alcohol produced for 
non-beverage purposes, such as industrial alcohol. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 84-96 for a discussion of this era. 
 8. Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 121-142 for a discussion of this antidiscrimination 
jurisprudence. 
 11. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964). 
 12. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275-6 (1984). 
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As this legal evolution was occurring, forces of economic change 
were sweeping the country.  After Prohibition ended in 1933, individual 
states enacted various forms of regulation of commerce in alcohol.  The 
most common form of regulation is the “three-tiered” system, in which 
producers of alcohol cannot sell their products directly to consumers.  
They must sell their products to licensed wholesalers, which in turn must 
sell to licensed retailers, which sell to the consumer.13  In the early years 
after Prohibition ended, there was explosive growth in the number of 
wholesalers, resulting in vigorous competition at the wholesale tier.  In 
recent decades, however, there has been massive consolidation in this 
industry and market power has become concentrated in relatively few 
firms.  By contrast, the number of small, often family-owned wineries 
has skyrocketed.  Individually, the production of these small wineries is 
small.  The large wholesalers tend to lack interest in marketing such 
wines because they need large-volume sales in order to remain 
competitive.  Some states enacted legislation allowing wine producers 
within the state to ship their products directly to consumers, in order to 
encourage a domestic wine industry.  Lacking a satisfactory market for 
their wines in the three-tier system, small wineries turned to direct sales, 
not only to consumers within their own states, but also to consumers in 
other states that lacked their own high-quality wine industries.  Such 
sales were facilitated by yet another economic change: the growth in 
telecommunications, especially the Internet.  Now a wine lover in one 
state could simply pick up the telephone or hop on the Internet and 
purchase wine produced in another state.  The producer could ship the 
wine directly to the consumer via common carrier.  Indeed, retailers in 
wine-producing states jumped on the bandwagon and also shipped wine 
directly to consumers in other states.14 
Vested interests in the three-tiered systems, especially wholesalers, 
sensed that such direct shipment posed a threat to their market power 
and demanded that states enforce their laws that prohibited importation 
of alcohol, including wine, other than through licensed wholesalers.15  
The wine industry reacted to this pressure with litigation seeking to 
overturn the ban on direct shipment to consumers in those states that 
prohibit direct shipment of wine by out-of-state producers but permit in-
 
 13. Douglas, supra note 4, at 1619; Shanker, supra note 4, at 355; Miller, supra note 4, at 
2496-97. 
 14. Dana Nigro, Tide Turns in Direct Shipping Battle, WINE SPECTATOR 1 (October 15, 
2002), available at http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Archives/Show_Article/ 0,1275,3880,00. 
html (last visited November 24, 2003). 
 15. Id. 
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state wine producers to do so.16  As of this writing, lower federal courts, 
including five appellate circuits, have rendered conflicting rulings on the 
validity of such laws.17  Since there is already a conflict among the 
circuit courts of appeal on an important constitutional issue and there is 
no end in sight to this litigation, the direct shipment issue is a prime 
candidate for review by the Supreme Court.18 
The thesis of this Article is that states which presently prohibit 
direct shipment of wine to consumers from out-of-state sources but 
permit such direct shipment from in-state sources should now give 
serious consideration to repealing their bans on direct shipment of wine 
from out-of-state sources.  The resolution of this issue by the Supreme 
Court cannot be predicted with certainty, but the Court’s current 
Commerce Clause and Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence weighs 
heavily in favor of the argument that differential treatment of direct 
shipments of wine from out-of-state and in-state sources violates the 
Commerce Clause and is not closely related to powers reserved to the 
States by the Twenty-first Amendment.  Rather than facing the likely 
prospect of court-imposed remedies, state legislatures should craft 
reforms best suited to individual states’ needs, such as tying repeal of the 
ban on direct shipment of wine from out-of-state sources to collection of 
state taxes on the transaction. 
Part II of this Article describes the nineteenth century struggle 
between the Prohibition movement and the alcoholic beverage industry 
that fostered a complex history of court decisions limiting state authority 
in this area under the aegis of the Commerce Clause, and congressional 
attempts to abrogate these decisions.  This struggle culminated in the 
adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, which established a nationwide 
regime of Prohibition.19  Part III discusses the reasons why Prohibition 
was a failure, thus prompting adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment, 
and also traces the evolution of the Court’s interpretation of that 
Amendment to the current approach, which seeks to accommodate its 
principles to the principles of the Commerce Clause.  Part IV provides 
an account of the Court’s general treatment of state laws that afford less 
favorable treatment to interstate commerce than to intrastate commerce.  
Part V canvasses the current litigation challenging direct shipment laws 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 143-215. 
 18. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a).  A conflict between decisions by federal courts of appeals is one 
reason that will be considered by the Supreme Court in deciding whether to grant review on writ of 
certiorari.  Id. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
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in various states, and the judicial decisions in those cases.  Part VI 
provides an analysis of the arguments on both sides of the issue and 
contends that the Supreme Court is likely to hold such laws 
unconstitutional.  The Article concludes that states with such laws 
should now begin the process of repealing their laws banning direct 
shipment of wine from out-of-state sources and replacing them with 
regulatory schemes that permit direct shipment but assure that applicable 
taxes are paid and other valid state interests are protected. 
II.  THE ROAD TO THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT 
A.  The Prohibition Movement 
During the nineteenth century, many Americans became convinced 
that consumption of alcohol would undermine the health and moral 
strength of the nation and that it must be eliminated.  In 1869, the 
Prohibition Party was founded in response to this concern.  Four years 
later, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union was organized.  Both 
organizations lobbied for nationwide prohibition of alcoholic beverages.  
They also lobbied for prohibition on a state-by-state basis, for legislation 
to give local communities the option to vote for local prohibition, and 
for restrictions on the transportation and sale of alcoholic beverages.  
These early efforts achieved limited success.  Congress did not enact a 
nationwide ban.  Some, but not all, states did enact legislation 
prohibiting the production, sale and transportation of alcohol within their 
own borders.  Since other states did not enact prohibition, however, 
alcohol continued to be produced in non-Prohibition states, as well as in 
other nations.20 
The alcohol industry responded to the enactment of prohibition 
legislation within individual states with litigation challenging the 
constitutionality of such laws.  The first case to reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Mugler v. Kansas, involved a state law that prohibited, with 
limited exceptions, the manufacture and sale of alcohol within the 
state.21  The issue was not whether states have the authority to prohibit 
alcohol production for sale within the states.  Instead, the issue was 
whether states may prohibit production for one’s personal use.22  The 
 
 20. See generally, DONALD BARR CHIDSEY, ON AND OFF THE WAGON 23-56 (Cowles Book 
Co. 1969); SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 899-900 
(Oxford University Press 1965). 
 21. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 653, 655 (1887). 
 22. Id. at 657-660 (explaining that it was already well-established that states had the authority 
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Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause does not 
bar this form of prohibition.23  The Court reasoned that courts must defer 
to the legislative judgment that allowing the noncommercial production 
of alcohol “would tend to cripple, if it did not defeat, the effort to guard 
the community against the evils attending the excessive use of such 
liquors.”24  The Commerce Clause was not implicated because the case 
involved noncommercial production.  Thus, Mugler established only that 
a state may ban alcohol production within its own borders, whether for 
commercial or noncommercial use.25 
B.  State Prohibition and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Alcohol continued to be produced in non-Prohibition states, 
however, and the year after Mugler was decided, the issue arose whether 
a Prohibition state had the authority to prohibit the import of alcohol 
from non-Prohibition states.  In Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Railway 
Co., the Court held that this form of prohibition ran afoul of the 
Commerce Clause.26  The Court had previously ruled that the Commerce 
Clause does not bar states from prohibiting the sale of imported alcohol 
after it had been brought into the state.27  The Bowman Court, however, 
asserted that the Thurlow ruling was premised upon the notion that a 
person has the antecedent right to import alcohol from another state.28  
More importantly, the Court invoked dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence: Congress’ failure to regulate a particular area of interstate 
commerce necessarily implies that Congress intended that area to be free 
of regulation.29  In Bowman, Congress had not chosen to regulate alcohol 
imports, thus expressing its intent that such imports be free of 
regulation.30  Thus, a state “cannot, without the consent of Congress, 
express or implied, regulate commerce between its people and those of 
the other States of the Union in order to effect its end, however desirable 
such a regulation might be.”31  Without this constitutional constraint, the 
Court asserted that the American economy would descend into anarchy 
and confusion; every state would be free to restrict the flow of articles 
 
to prohibit commercial production). 
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. at 662. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Railway Co., 125 U.S. 465, 492-3 (1888). 
 27. Thurlow v. Massachusettes, 46 U.S. 504 (1847). 
 28. Bowman, 125 U.S. at 479. 
 29. Id. at 479-480. 
 30. Id. at 482-83. 
 31. Id. at 492. 
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produced in other states and to protect its domestic producers from 
competition by producers from other states.32  The law at issue in 
Bowman was not of the latter type because it prohibited all commerce in 
alcohol, domestic and out-of-state alike.33  It was, however, of the 
former type, for it represented an attempt by one state to exercise power 
over articles within other states by preventing their passage out of those 
states.34 
While Bowman held that, in the absence of congressional 
legislation, the Commerce Clause bars one state from prohibiting the 
import of alcohol from other states, it expressly left open the question 
whether a state could prohibit its sale once it had been imported.35  That 
question arose two years later in Leisy v. Hardin.36  A brewer from 
Illinois, a non-Prohibition state, imported beer into Iowa, a Prohibition 
state.37  Because of the Bowman decision, Iowa lacked authority to stop 
the importation, but it seized the beer before it could be sold.38  In the 
brewer’s ensuing litigation to recover the beer, the Supreme Court held 
that the Commerce Clause bars states from prohibiting the sale of 
imported alcoholic beverages in their original, unbroken packages.39  As 
in Bowman, the Court relied upon a negative construction of the 
Commerce Clause.40  Since it grants exclusive power to Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce, states have no power to regulate such 
commerce without the approval of Congress.41 In particular, a state law 
that inhibits the disposition of an imported commodity while it is still an 
article of commerce amounts to a regulation of interstate commerce.42  
Thus, a state has no authority, without congressional permission, to 
prohibit the sale of alcohol that remains in its original package.43 
Although the Mugler decision appeared to be a great victory for the 
Prohibition Movement by upholding the authority of a state to ban the 
production and sale of alcohol, the victory was short-lived.  The 
Bowman and Leisy decisions deprived Prohibition states of the authority 
to ban the import or sale of alcohol in its original package from non-
 
 32. Id. at 493-94. 
 33. See id. at 496. 
 34. Id. at 496. 
 35. Id. at 500. 
 36. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 125. 
 40. Id. at 119. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 123. 
 43. Id. 
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Prohibition states.44  Worse yet for prohibitionists, alcohol producers 
from non-Prohibition states had no competition from domestic producers 
in Prohibition states (for there were no legal ones), so erstwhile “dry” 
states promised to be lucrative markets for imported alcohol. 
C.  Congressional Abrogation of Judicial Limits on State Prohibition 
The Prohibition Movement quickly reacted to this vexing situation 
by flexing its increasing political muscle in Congress. In 1890, the same 
year Leisy was decided, Congress passed the Wilson Act.45  This statute 
filled the void noted in Leisy, by providing that alcohol imported into a 
state shall be subject to the laws of that state to the same extent as if it 
had been produced within the state, regardless of whether it remains in 
its original package.46  Thus, if a state prohibited the sale of domestically 
produced alcohol, the Wilson Act also allowed it to prohibit the sale of 
imports.  Congress had, in effect, granted states the very permission to 
stop commerce in imported alcohol that was lacking in Leisy. 
The Wilson Act immediately was challenged in court by a person 
who had been arrested in Kansas for attempting to sell liquor imported 
from Missouri, in violation of Kansas law.47  In Wilkerson v. Rahrer, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce 
Clause to allow states to curb freedom of interstate commerce.48  The 
Court reasoned that Congress’ exclusive power over interstate commerce 
includes the power to divest certain articles of their interstate 
commercial character, thereby incorporating such articles into the 
general mass of property within the state and subjecting them to the 
plenary police power of that state.49  Thus, the Wilson Act divested 
original-package imported alcohol of its interstate character, thereby 
subjecting it to the Kansas prohibition against the sale of alcohol.50 
While the Wilson Act as construed in Rahrer abrogated the Leisy 
decision, it left Bowman untouched.  Imported alcohol could not be sold 
in a Prohibition state, but it could still be imported.  Industry and 
consumers soon found the loophole: direct shipment.  In Rhodes v. Iowa, 
a resident of Iowa, a Prohibition state, purchased alcohol from a 
 
 44. Bowman, 125 U.S. at 465; Leisy, 135 U.S. at 100. 
 45. 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (now codified in 27 U.S.C. § 121). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Wilkerson v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891). 
 48. Id. at 560-1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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producer in Illinois, a non-Prohibition state.51  The producer delivered 
the alcohol in a box to a common carrier in Illinois, for direct shipment 
to the purchaser in Iowa.52  When the box arrived in Iowa, it was seized 
and destroyed.  Since the sale had been consummated in Illinois, there 
was no violation of Iowa’s prohibition on the sale of imported alcohol.  
Iowa attempted to avoid this problem by charging an agent of the carrier 
with violating Iowa’s ban on transporting alcohol.53  The Bowman 
decision had already established that such a prohibition, when applied to 
imports, violated the Commerce Clause.54  Iowa, however, argued that 
the Wilson Act had also abrogated Bowman by divesting commerce in 
alcohol of its interstate character once it arrives in a state, and subjecting 
it to state law.55  The Court acknowledged that one passage in the text of 
the Wilson Act supported this argument, but asserted that a literal 
interpretation of this passage would be inconsistent with the Act as a 
whole.56  The Court reasoned that a literal interpretation would give 
states the power to prohibit importation itself and force goods to remain 
in another state.57  Nothing in the Act, however, indicated that Congress 
had intended to give state law such extraterritorial reach, subjecting 
persons beyond that state’s borders to its own law.58  The Act was 
instead afforded a less expansive interpretation: imported alcohol was 
subject to state law “only after consummation of the shipment, but 
before the sale of the merchandise.”59  The imported alcohol would be 
free of state restrictions until the shipment was complete; at that point, 
state law would attach and, in a Prohibition state, it would be illegal to 
transport or sell the alcohol.  Under this interpretation, the common 
carrier was not subject to Iowa law because the shipment was not yet 
consummated.  Once the box was delivered to the Iowa purchaser, Iowa 
law would attach, but so long as the purchaser simply wanted to drink 
the alcohol, he too would not violate the Iowa prohibition on transport or 
sale. 
After Rhodes, direct shipment of imported alcohol to consumers 
loomed as a significant threat to Prohibition, but not for very long.  As 
did Bowman, Rhodes explicitly left a question open: whether Congress 
 
 51. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 13 (1989). 
 52. Id. at 413. 
 53. Id. at 413-14. 
 54. Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 465 (1888). 
 55. Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 419-20. 
 56. Id. at 420. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 421-22. 
 59. Id. at 423. 
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has the authority to submit interstate shipments of alcohol to state 
control.  In 1893, five years before Rhodes was decided, a powerful new 
political force had appeared on the scene: the Anti-Saloon League.60  
The older Prohibition Party and Women’s Christian Temperance Union 
had achieved only limited political success, in large part because their 
constituencies – primarily rural, small-town and female – were not 
broad-based.  The Anti-Saloon League, by contrast, drew its 
constituency from broad and diverse sectors of the population – 
academics, churches, political parties and business people.61  It played a 
leading role in persuading more states to enact Prohibition laws.  In 
addition, it helped ensure passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913.62  
In this Act, like the Wilson Act, Congress filled a void and abrogated a 
Supreme Court ruling.  It provided that alcohol was divested entirely of 
its interstate commercial character and that the manufacture, sale or 
shipment of alcohol into a state in violation of that state’s laws was 
prohibited.63 
The authority of Congress to thus subject all commerce in alcohol 
to state law came under scrutiny in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western 
Maryland Railway Co.64  West Virginia law prohibited the manufacture 
or sale of alcohol.  Unlike the laws in those states in which the current 
direct shipping litigation has arisen, West Virginia did not discriminate 
between out-of-state and domestic alcohol; its prohibition applied to 
both.65  A Maryland producer of alcohol sued for injunctive relief to 
permit it to ship alcohol directly to consumers in West Virginia, as 
Rhodes had given it the right to do.66  The Webb-Kenyon Act, however, 
had clearly abrogated Rhodes by providing that the state prohibitions 
were applicable to imports.67  The sole question, therefore, was whether 
Congress had the power to do so.68  The manufacturer contended that 
Congress lacked such power under the Commerce Clause because state 
alcohol laws varied widely, so that Webb-Kenyon would disrupt the 
national uniformity of regulation contemplated by that Clause.69  The 
Court countered, however, that Congress has power to prohibit all 
 
 60. MORISON, supra note 20, at 900. 
 61. Id. 
 62. 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (now codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1994)). 
 63. Id. 
 64. James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 315-18. 
 67. 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (now codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1994)). 
 68. Id. at 321-2. 
 69. Id. at 325-26. 
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shipment of alcohol, and that all-encompassing power includes the lesser 
power to permit some prohibition, by those states that choose to do so.70 
By upholding the power of Congress to subject shipments of 
imported alcohol to plenary state authority, the Court closed the direct 
shipment loophole created by Rhodes.  Significantly, however, it 
remained an open question whether, in exercising that authority, states 
could discriminate against imported alcohol in favor of domestically-
produced alcohol; Clark Distilling did not present that issue.  It has 
remained an open issue to this day. 
D.  The Eighteenth Amendment 
Ironically, the Clark Distilling Court also foreshadowed an 
important factor that ultimately accelerated the downfall of Prohibition.  
Webb-Kenyon made it federal law, enforceable by federal authorities, 
that it is illegal to traffic in alcohol in violation of state law.  Since state 
authorities also had power to enforce their own state’s laws, Webb-
Kenyon was intended “to produce cooperation between the local and 
national forces of government.”71  Initially, the vision of federal-state 
cooperation in enforcing Prohibition reached its zenith in 1919, when the 
Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified.72  Section 
one of the Amendment created a nationwide regime of Prohibition, 
making it unlawful to manufacture, sell, or transport alcohol in the 
United States, regardless of state law; alcohol was now outlawed even in 
States that previously had permitted it.73  Section two conferred 
concurrent power on Congress and the states to enforce Prohibition.74  
The legal debate was over. The Prohibition movement had achieved 
unconditional success.  As it turned out, however, success contained the 
seeds of its own destruction. 
 
 70. Id. at 326-27. 
 71. Id. at 331. 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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III.  THE DOWNFALL OF PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE TWENTY-
FIRST AMENDMENT 
A.  The Downfall of Prohibition 
The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited only the manufacture, sale 
and transportation of alcohol.  The possession and consumption of 
alcohol remained legal, and many Americans were eager to obtain it.  
Others saw a lucrative opportunity to serve this market by robbing, 
burglarizing and hijacking established stocks of alcohol.75  Still others 
created a bootlegging industry, in which alcohol was smuggled from 
abroad into the United States and sold at great profit.76  Even physicians 
became involved in this illegal commerce.  Alcohol remained legal when 
used for medicinal purposes.  Many physicians resorted to selling 
alcohol to their patients for pleasure drinking out of fear they would lose 
their patients to other physicians if they did not.77  Many people resorted 
to producing alcohol in their own homes.  Alcohol consumption among 
some sectors of the population actually increased during national 
Prohibition.78 
These evasions of Prohibition might have been prevented if the 
scheme of concurrent federal and state enforcement had been effective, 
but it was not.  The law was unpopular with many Americans, so state 
authorities gave priority to enforcing other laws deemed more important 
by the populace.79  Established federal authorities such as the F.B.I. had 
more than enough work already, so special agents were hired to enforce 
Prohibition.  They were poorly paid, so their enforcement efforts were 
deflected by various forms of bribery.80 
B.  The Rise of the Twenty-first Amendment 
This combination of great demand, ready supply and ineffectual 
enforcement was the downfall of national Prohibition.  Its fate was 
sealed by ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment.81  Section one of 
 
 75. CHIDSEY, supra note 20, at 79-83; MORISON, supra note 20, at 900-01. 
 76. CHIDSEY, supra note 20, at 91-101; MORISON, supra note 20, at 900.  See also FON 
BOARDMAN, AMERICA AND THE JAZZ AGE 69-70 (Henry Z. Walck, Inc. 1968). 
 77. CHIDSEY, supra note 20, at 81-82. 
 78. BOARDMAN, supra note 76, at 74. 
 79. CHIDSEY, supra note 20, at 78-9 and 85-9; MORISON, supra note 20, at 902. 
 80. CHIDSEY, supra note 20, at 78-9 and 85-9; MORISON, supra note 20, at 902. 
 81. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. 
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that Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, thus ending 
national Prohibition and the hapless system of joint federal-state 
enforcement.82  Far from opening the door to unrestricted commerce in 
alcohol, however, Section two of that Amendment provided that the 
import or transportation of alcohol in violation of state law is 
prohibited.83  In effect, Section two of the Twenty-first Amendment 
constitutionalized the Webb-Kenyon Act.  Its literal text suggests that it 
conferred unfettered constitutional authority upon the states to regulate 
commerce in alcohol.  The text is silent, however, on the relationship 
between Section two and the rest of the Constitution. 
1.  Early Judicial Interpretation:  Unrestricted State Power 
Since Section two prohibited the import or transportation of alcohol 
into a state in violation of that state’s law, it clashed with established 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which barred state regulation of 
interstate commerce, including commerce in alcohol.84  Early cases 
resolved this clash in favor of Section two.  In State Board of 
Equalization v. Young’s Market Co., a California statute imposed a fee 
for the privilege of importing beer into the state.85  An import wholesaler 
claimed this fee violated the Commerce Clause.86  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that, prior to ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, 
the fee would have been unconstitutional “not because it resulted in 
discrimination, but because the fee would be a direct burden on interstate 
commerce.”87  The Court concluded, however, that the terms of Section 
two “confer upon the State the power to forbid all importations which do 
not comply with the conditions which it prescribes.”88  In the Court’s 
view, to accept the wholesaler’s argument – that imported beer was 
subject to a fee that domestic beer was not – would require an 
interpretation of Section two that imports must be allowed to compete on 
an equal basis with domestic alcohol; such an interpretation, however, 
“would involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a rewriting of 
it.”89  The Court went so far as to say that a state may prohibit all 
imported alcohol to protect its domestic industry and, if so, it may adopt 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 26-70 for a discussion of this jurisprudence. 
 85. State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Market, 299 U.S. 59, 60 (1936). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 61-2. 
 88. Id. at 62. 
 89. Id. 
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a less restrictive regulation such as an import fee.90  Nevertheless, the 
Court explicitly left open the question whether Section two confers upon 
the states, when regulating commerce in alcohol, the power to engage in 
the type of discrimination prohibited by the Commerce Clause.91 
Economic warfare between the states is the very evil that the 
Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence was 
designed to prevent.  The very type of law upheld in Young’s Market, 
however, provoked just such warfare.  Like California, Indiana imposed 
a fee to import beer into the state.  In retaliation, Michigan enacted a 
statute prohibiting the sale of beer produced in a state that, in Michigan’s 
view, discriminated against Michigan beer.  Indiana was named as one 
such state because of its import fee.92  In Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. 
Liquor Commission, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that such 
retaliation violates the Commerce Clause and that the Twenty-first 
Amendment should not be interpreted to allow one state to punish 
another for doing what the Amendment permits – imposing a fee on 
imports.93  The Court’s rationale was of breathtaking scope: “Since the 
Twenty-first Amendment, as held in the Young case, the right of a state 
to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not 
limited by the Commerce Clause.”94  Young’s Market, of course, had 
said no such thing; the Court in that case explicitly reserved the question 
whether a state alcohol law that created the sort of discrimination against 
interstate commerce proscribed by the Commerce Clause was valid 
under the Twenty-first Amendment.95  Moreover, in the same year as the 
Brewing Co. decision, the Court had again left open this very question.96  
Thus, the Brewing Co. decision broke new ground. 
2.  The Current Interpretation: Accommodation 
If the Twenty-first Amendment is “not limited by the Commerce 
Clause,” it would seem to follow that it is not limited by any other 
provisions of the Constitution.  Yet would any competent attorney be 
willing to argue that a state may permit only white persons to import 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 62.  See also Zifferin v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 137-8 (1939) (explaining that the 
Twenty-first Amendment confers power upon states to permit manufacture and sale of alcohol only 
under certain conditions; state laws that do not discriminate against interstate commerce but only 
burden it fall within this power). 
 92. See Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391, 392-93 (1939). 
 93. Id. at 392-94. 
 94. Id. at 394. 
 95. Young’s Market, 299 U.S. at 64. 
 96. Zifferin, 308 U.S. at 140. 
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alcohol, unrestrained by the Equal Protection Clause?97  A quarter 
century after the Brewing Co. decision, the Court disavowed its 
sweeping dictum.  In Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 
alcohol was sold tax-free at a New York airport to travelers departing on 
international flights.98  These transactions were regulated by a federal 
agency acting under the authority of federal law.99  These sales, 
however, were considered illegal under New York law, thus presenting a 
case in which state law clashed with congressional legislation enacted 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause.100  The Court rejected the argument 
that the Twenty-first Amendment had repealed the Commerce Clause: 
“If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto ‘repealed,’ then Congress 
would be left with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign 
commerce in intoxicating liquor.  Such a conclusion would be patently 
bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect.”101 
Having rejected a textually literal interpretation of the Amendment, 
the Court concluded that the prohibition of Section two must be 
accommodated with the commands of the Commerce Clause: “Like 
other provisions of the Constitution, each must be considered in light of 
the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake in any 
concrete case.”102  In this case, the Court explained, New York had 
attempted to prohibit a transaction authorized by congressional 
legislation enacted pursuant to its express power to regulate interstate 
and foreign commerce, and “[t]his New York cannot constitutionally 
do.”103  While the accommodation standard is quite indefinite, the 
holding is clear: the Twenty-first Amendment does not empower states 
to enact alcohol legislation that conflicts with an exercise of Congress’ 
express power to regulate interstate commerce. 
The Commerce Clause does not expressly provide that states may 
not burden or discriminate against interstate commerce.  This 
proposition is a judicial construction of the Clause, inferred from 
congressional silence in a particular area.104  Young’s Market and 
Brewing Co. did not involve a clash between state law and congressional 
legislation, so it remained an open question whether states may burden 
 
 97. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that state alcohol regulation is subject to 
scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 98. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964). 
 99. Id. at 325-27. 
 100. Id. at 329. 
 101. Id. at 331-32. 
 102. Id. at 332. 
 103. Id. at 333-34. 
 104. See supra text accompanying notes 22-34. 
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or discriminate against commerce in alcohol in the absence of 
congressional legislation.  That question arose in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. 
v. Dias.105  Hawaii imposed an excise tax on wholesale liquor sales, but 
exempted certain liquors produced in Hawaii in order to encourage 
development of the state’s liquor industry.106  Applying the 
accommodation principle of Hostetter, the Court first held this tax 
violated the Commerce Clause because it discriminated against interstate 
commerce by affording a commercial advantage to local business: “[n]o 
State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may impose a tax which 
discriminates against interstate commerce . . . by providing a direct 
commercial advantage to local business.”107  Either a discriminatory 
purpose or discriminatory effect runs afoul of the Commerce Clause, and 
in this case both were present: the avowed purpose of the tax exemption 
was to protect a local industry against competition and its effect was 
discriminatory because it only applied to local products.108  Second, the 
Court provided the following rule for accommodating the Commerce 
Clause to the Twenty-first Amendment: the interests promoted by a state 
alcohol regulation that discriminate against interstate commerce must be 
so closely related to the powers reserved to the states by the Twenty-first 
Amendment as to outweigh the evils of economic protectionism that the 
Commerce Clause was designed to prevent.109  In this case, the intent of 
the tax exemption was to favor a local liquor industry at the expense of 
out-of-state competition, but that was not a central purpose of the 
Amendment.  The Court suggested that promotion of temperance was a 
central purpose of the Amendment, but Hawaii did not contend the 
exemption was designed to promote temperance (perhaps wisely, as the 
exemption would appear to encourage consumption by making local 
liquor cheaper).110  The Court acknowledged that there is some doubt as 
to what the core concerns of the Amendment are, but economic 
protectionism is not one of them.111 
The three-justice dissent in Bacchus is worth noting at this point 
because it provides the argumentative framework for the current direct 
shipping debate.  The dissent asserted that the critical point in the case is 
that, unlike Hostetter, the Hawaii tax exemption was not inconsistent 
 
 105. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 263 (1984). 
 106. Id. at 265. 
 107. Id. at 268. 
 108. Id. at 265. 
 109. Id. at 275-76. 
 110. See id. at 276. 
 111. Id. at 275-76. 
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with a congressional regulation of commerce, so there was no clash 
between two express provisions of the Constitution, as in Hostetter.112  
Instead, the tax fell within the express power reserved to states by the 
Amendment.113  Since the tax did not purport to divest Congress of 
power to regulate commerce in alcohol, the Court must give effect to the 
text of the Amendment and uphold the tax.114  In the dissent’s view, 
then, the only manner in which the Commerce Clause restricts state 
alcohol regulation is to prohibit such regulation when it conflicts with 
legislation enacted by Congress pursuant to the express power conferred 
by the Commerce Clause. 
The Court’s interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment has thus 
evolved from a literalist approach, in which the Commerce Clause 
imposes no limitation on state regulation of alcohol, to a two-tiered 
approach: (1) state alcohol regulation that conflicts with federal 
regulation is invalid; (2) state alcohol regulation that violates the 
Commerce Clause, and that is not so closely related to a central concern 
of the Twenty-first Amendment as to outweigh the harm done to a 
central value of the Commerce Clause, is invalid.  The latter 
accommodation principle initially requires analysis of whether any 
particular state regulation violates the Commerce Clause in the absence 
of congressional legislation on the subject.  It is useful, therefore, to 
discuss the Court’s current dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
IV.  CURRENT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Commerce Clause expressly confers power upon Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce.  It does not, however, by its terms limit 
state authority in any particular area of commerce where such authority 
does not conflict with congressional legislation.  This lack of express 
limit upon state authority had led some to question the power of the 
federal judiciary to impose limits upon state authority with respect to 
interstate commerce.115  Nevertheless, even those Justices who question 
the legitimacy of the dormant Commerce Clause concede that this 
doctrine serves the original purpose of the Commerce Clause – to protect 
the national economic market.116  The Court has consistently adhered to 
 
 112. See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 280 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 286-87. 
 115. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating, “[t]he negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the 
Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application[]”). 
 116. Id. at 595-6 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the position that judicial power to limit state commercial authority is 
essential to protecting the national market by preventing states from 
engaging in “the evils of ‘economic isolation’ and ‘protectionism.’”117  
Such judicial power is essential because out-of-state interests that may 
be adversely affected by state legislation lack effective political 
representation as a safeguard against protectionist legislation.118  There 
appears to be little, if any, prospect that the Court will abandon this 
central principle in the foreseeable future. 
The contours of the dormant Commerce Clause, however, have 
evolved significantly since the nineteenth century, when the Court in 
Bowman and Leisy imposed limits on state authority to prohibit alcohol 
imports.  In that era, the Court hewed to a rule that states may not 
regulate interstate commerce in areas where the subject matter demands 
national uniform rules, which Congress has exclusive power to enact; in 
areas of primarily local concern, on the other hand, states have the power 
to enact legislation even if it incidentally burdens interstate 
commerce.119  Thus, in Bowman and Leisy, the Court struck down 
prohibitions against alcohol imports solely on the ground that states may 
not regulate interstate commerce where uniform national regulation is 
required, even though the statutes in those cases did not discriminate 
against imports.120 
In the twentieth century, however, grave difficulties arose over 
attempts to distinguish between areas of commerce that require uniform 
national rules and those that do not.  To eliminate these difficulties, the 
Court adopted a two-tiered approach to state regulation that does not 
depend on the unworkable national uniformity test.  First, a 
nondiscriminatory state law (i.e., one that treats domestic and interstate 
commerce equally) that incidentally burdens interstate commerce “will 
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”121  Second, a state 
law that discriminates against interstate commerce (i.e., one that favors 
domestic commerce at the expense of interstate commerce) must serve a 
legitimate local interest that cannot be served equally well by 
 
 117. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 
447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-4 (1988); West Lynn 
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994); C. & A. Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 
383, 390 (1994). 
 118. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986). 
 119. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 26-44 for a discussion of the Bowman and Leisy 
decisions. 
 121. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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nondiscriminatory alternatives.122 
The first tier of this approach has not withstood critical analysis as 
well as the second tier.  As to evenhanded state commercial regulation, 
critics have contended that balancing the burden on interstate commerce 
against local benefits is not a valid concern of the Commerce Clause.  In 
their view, the core concern of the Commerce Clause is to prevent states 
from intentionally discriminating against interstate commerce, and in the 
absence of such economic protectionism, judicial review is 
unwarranted.123  These critics further charge that when the Court 
purports to apply the balancing test and concludes that local benefits are 
outweighed by burdens on commerce, it is not in fact balancing these 
interests; instead, the rhetoric of balancing obscures the actual rationale: 
the state law at issue is a protectionist measure.124  This view, that the 
balancing tier of the dormant Commerce Clause should be abandoned, 
appears to have gained some favor within the Court.125 
Critics of the balancing test, on the other hand, applaud the strict 
scrutiny applied to discriminatory state commercial regulation.  In their 
view, state economic protectionism is the very evil the Commerce 
Clause was designed to eliminate,126 so it follows that the judiciary 
should have the power to invalidate such laws.  The Court, without 
dissent, has vigorously enforced the nondiscrimination principle to this 
day.127  In this scheme, it is important to distinguish between 
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory laws.  A state law discriminates 
against interstate commerce when it places out-of-state products at an 
economic disadvantage against domestic products because of their 
geographic origin. 128  Even if the burden of a state law falls primarily 
upon out-of-state competitors, it is not discriminatory so long as the 
burden is not imposed because of geographic origin.129  Moreover, the 
Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that a state law is not 
 
 122. See, e.g., Taylor, 477 U.S. at 140. 
 123. See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092-1100 (1986). 
 124. Id. at 1209-20. 
 125. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 617-20 
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 126. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 123, at 1113-18. 
 127. See supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text.  See also Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992). 
 128. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 
447 U.S. 27, 39 (1980); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988); Wyoming, 502 U.S. 
at 455; Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 576-78. 
 129. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125-6 (1978); Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-2 (1981). 
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discriminatory where it does not prohibit imports outright, but only 
imposes conditions upon the import or sale of out-of-state products; 
where such conditions provide an economic advantage to domestic 
products, they are discriminatory.130  The Court has also rejected the 
argument that where two laws are valid in and of themselves, conjoining 
them in a single program is also valid despite any resulting 
discrimination; economic protectionism is just as great an evil when 
produced by the conjunction of two otherwise valid laws as when 
produced by a single discriminatory law.131 
Strict scrutiny of discriminatory state commercial regulation has 
proved strict indeed.  In some cases, the Court has held that such 
discrimination is invalid, regardless of whatever local interest it might 
serve.132  In other cases, where states have proferred a legitimate local 
interest as the justification for discriminatory regulation, in each case but 
one the Court has concluded that justification did not survive strict 
scrutiny.  The Court has concluded either that the proferred local interest 
was insufficient in and of itself to justify the discrimination,133 or that the 
discriminatory regulation failed adequately to further the local 
interest.134 
The one exception, Maine v. Taylor,135 provides some elaboration 
of strict scrutiny analysis.  A Maine statute prohibited the import of live 
baitfish, the most direct form of discrimination imaginable.136  The only 
issue was whether the statute served a legitimate local purpose that could 
not be served equally well by available nondiscriminatory measures.137  
The proffered local interest was to protect domestic baitfish from 
invasion of their habitat by parasites and nonnative species.138  The 
District Court made two findings of fact: that imported baitfish would 
indeed threaten domestic baitfish in this manner, and that no other means 
were available to prevent this threat because there were no procedures to 
test for the presence of parasites.139  The Court held: “Although the 
 
 130. See, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350-52; New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 275. 
 131. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1994). 
 132. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624, 626-27; Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36; New Energy Co., 486 U.S. 
at 273; West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 193; Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 581.  See also 
Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 456-58 (rejecting argument that Congress has conferred power upon states to 
enact discriminatory laws). 
 133. See, e.g., C. & A. Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1994). 
 134. See, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353. 
 135. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 131(1986). 
 136. Id. at 137-38. 
 137. Id. at 140. 
 138. Id. at 133. 
 139. Id. at 142-43. 
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proferred justification for any local discrimination against interstate 
commerce must be subjected to ‘the strictest scrutiny,’ the empirical 
component of that scrutiny, like any other form of factfinding, ‘is the 
basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts’”;140 
appellate courts may not reverse such findings merely because they 
disagree with them, but only where they are clearly erroneous.141  Thus, 
there are both legal and factual inquiries to be made in determining 
whether discriminatory state regulation survives strict scrutiny.  The 
legal component is whether a proferred local interest is legitimate.  The 
factual components are whether the regulation adequately serves that 
interest and whether the local interest can be served equally well by an 
available nondiscriminatory measure.  A district court’s findings as to 
the factual components will be afforded wide deference, and so long as it 
makes permissible inferences from the evidence, an appellate court may 
not disturb its findings.142 
This evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence reveals that state 
laws which place out-of-state products at an economic disadvantage, due 
to their geographical origin, are far more vulnerable to constitutional 
challenge than evenhanded state laws which incidentally burden 
interstate commerce.  The former must actually serve a legitimate local 
interest that cannot be served by available nondiscriminatory means, 
whereas the local benefits of a nondiscriminatory law need only 
outweigh its burden on commerce.  It is precisely for this reason that 
recent litigation over state alcohol regulation has focused on states which 
ban out-of-state wine producers from shipping their products directly to 
consumers within the state, while permitting domestic wine producers to 
do so. 
V.  THE DIRECT SHIPMENT LITIGATION 
Litigation concerning the direct shipment controversy has yielded 
judicial decisions in six states.  A state-by-state analysis will assist in 
revealing the competing arguments over the proper way to accommodate 
the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause with the scope 
of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment. 
 
 140. Id. at 144-45. 
 141. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 145.  FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) provides: “Findings of fact, whether based 
on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .” 
 142. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). 
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A.  Indiana (Seventh Circuit) 
Indiana law provides that it is unlawful for persons who sell 
alcoholic beverages in other states to ship such beverages directly to 
consumers in Indiana, while Indiana sellers may do so.143  Indiana 
consumers brought suit, claiming that such differential treatment was 
unconstitutional.144  The district court held that this law violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause, but the court of appeals reversed.145  The 
court began its analysis by appearing to concede that permitting local 
sellers but not sellers in other states to ship directly to Indiana consumers 
discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce 
Clause.146  The parties framed the issue as whether such discrimination 
furthers a core purpose of the Twentieth-first Amendment, apparently 
believing that the Supreme Court’s admonition to harmonize the 
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment applied to this 
case.147 
The court of appeals, however, took a different tack, at least in part: 
“our guide is the text and history of the Constitution, not the ‘purposes’ 
or ‘concerns’ that may or may not have animated its drafters.”148  The 
panel reviewed the nineteenth century history of some states’ efforts to 
prohibit commerce in alcohol and judicial decisions limiting such 
efforts, resulting in a deadlock: states could prohibit sales of alcohol 
within their own borders but lacked power to prohibit out-of-state sellers 
from shipping directly to consumers.149  The Webb-Kenyon Act and the 
Eighteenth Amendment broke the deadlock and gave states authority to 
bar direct shipment; in the panel’s view, although Section one of the 
Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, Section 
two raised the Webb-Kenyon Act to constitutional status and gave states 
authority to ban direct shipments.  The panel acknowledged that the 
Supreme Court has held states may not use their power under Section 
two to discriminate against out-of-state sellers in favor of in-state sellers.  
Even though Indiana allowed direct shipment only by in-state sellers and 
the panel initially appeared to concede this was discriminatory, it 
appeared to contradict itself by concluding this was not discriminatory: 
all alcohol, wherever produced, must pass through the three-tiered 
 
 143. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. at 849, 854. 
 146. See id. at 851. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 851. 
 149. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851. 
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system and be taxed.150  Thus, direct shipments from Indiana sellers to 
consumers are taxed, and the prohibition on direct shipment from out-of-
state requires that imports pass through the three-tiered system so as to 
enable collection of the same taxes.151  The court never explained how 
shipments directly from Indiana wineries to consumers somehow passed 
through the three-tiered system.152  Indeed, the opposite would appear to 
be the case, since direct shipment by definition bypasses wholesalers and 
retailers (and the attendant price mark-ups). 
B.  Florida (Eleventh Circuit) 
The Seventh Circuit panel noted that the plaintiffs in that case were 
consumers whose complaint was that they could not receive direct 
shipments of imported alcohol.153  Thus, the case did not involve an out-
of-state seller complaining of an inability to ship directly to consumers.  
Such a complaint arose in Florida.154  Florida law prohibited any person 
from shipping alcohol from out-of-state directly to consumers, but 
allowed Florida wineries to do so.155  The district court followed the 
analytical framework established by the Supreme Court.156  It concluded 
that this law discriminates against out-of-state wineries by prohibiting 
them from shipping directly to consumers while permitting licensed in-
state wineries to do so, and that Florida’s legitimate interests “can be 
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”157  In 
particular, Florida’s interest in collecting taxes on imported alcohol can 
be satisfied by requiring out-of-state wineries to collect Florida taxes.158  
The district court also concluded, however, that the expressed purposes 
of Florida’s ban on direct shipments – to protect public welfare, revenue 
collection and the economy – fell within the core concerns of Section 
two of the Twenty-first Amendment.159  Oddly, the district court asserted 
that invalidating the ban would undermine Florida’s ability to collect 
taxes even though it previously found that out-of-state wineries could 
 
 150. Id. at 853-54. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. at 849. 
 154. Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1311 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
 155. Bridenbaugh, 277 F3d. at 854. 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 71-84 for a discussion of the Court’s analytical 
framework for accommodating the dormant Commerce Clause to Section two of the Twenty-first 
Amendment. 
 157. Bainbridge, 148 F. Supp. 2d. at 1311. 
 158. Id. at 1312. 
 159. Id. 
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collect the taxes.160  The court also noted the decision of the Seventh 
Circuit, in upholding an identical law, rejected core concerns analysis 
and relied upon the text and history of the Twenty-first Amendment.161  
This case, however, concerned out-of-state retailers’ complaints rather 
than consumers, so core concerns analysis was appropriate.162 
The court of appeals applied the same analysis as the district court 
but concluded the record did not clearly demonstrate that the ban on 
direct shipment was closely related to a core concern of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, and remanded for findings of fact on that issue.163  Like the 
district court, the panel found the Florida law discriminatory on its face 
because in-state wine producers can ship directly to consumers but out-
of-state producers cannot.164  It failed to survive strict scrutiny under the 
Commerce Clause because Florida’s legitimate interest in generating 
revenue could be served by a nondiscriminatory alternative - licensing 
out-of-state wineries who intend to ship to consumers and requiring 
them to collect state taxes.165 
The appellate panel then addressed the question whether Florida’s 
law implicates a core concern of the Twenty-first Amendment and, if so, 
whether the State “demonstrates that it genuinely needs the law to 
effectuate its proferred core concern.”166  Thus, the panel read Supreme 
Court precedent as requiring not only that the state must identify a core 
concern of the Amendment that a discriminatory law was designed to 
serve, but also must prove that the law “is genuinely needed to effectuate 
the proferred core concern.”167  While the Supreme Court has been 
rather vague in identifying the core concerns of the Amendment, one 
plurality opinion has asserted that temperance, ensuring orderly market 
conditions, and raising revenue are core concerns.168  Florida asserted 
that protecting minors (one form of temperance, presumably) was a goal 
 
 160. Id. at 1313.  The district court also noted that direct shipment would facilitate sales to 
minors, thus undermining the state’s power to promote temperance.  Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1313-14. 
 163. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106, 1115 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 164. Id. at 1109.  The panel noted that, under Florida’s law, domestic producers must ship by 
their own or by leased vehicles and cannot use common carriers.  Id.  Thus, even if Florida’s law is 
unconstitutional, out-of-state producers could not ship by common carrier such as Federal Express.  
It would seem impractical for distant producers to ship to Florida via their own or leased vehicles, 
so this may be a hollow victory for consumers. 
 165. Id. at 1110.  The panel also noted that the state’s concern to prevent sales to minors can be 
achieved by imposing labeling requirements and enforcing criminal penalties. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1112. 
 167. Id. at 1114. 
 168. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (plurality opinion). 
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of the ban on direct out-of-state shipment, but the ban was not needed to 
effectuate that purpose because it could be achieved by licensing out-of-
state vendors and threatening sanctions against those who ship to 
minors.169 The panel was not sure what “ensuring orderly market 
conditions” means, but it clearly does not mean shutting out-of-state 
firms out of a state’s markets.170 As to raising revenue, assuming that it 
is a core concern, the panel repeated that the State must prove that the 
discrimination is needed in order to raise revenue.171  On that point, there 
remained an issue of fact to be decided by the district court: whether the 
State is unable to impose its taxes directly on out-of-state firms, just as it 
does on in-state firms.172 
The Eleventh Circuit panel made two other important points.  First, 
it strongly disagreed with the analytical framework employed by the 
Seventh Circuit, which relied solely on the text and history of the 
Twenty-first Amendment in determining whether a discriminatory state 
alcohol regulation is authorized.173  In the Eleventh Circuit’s view, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that such discrimination is authorized only if it 
closely related to a core concern of the Amendment.  Second, the 
Eleventh Circuit criticized the Seventh Circuit’s finding that there was 
no discrimination, since out-of-state vendors were clearly disadvantaged 
because they could not ship directly to consumers, whereas their in-state 
competitors could.174 
C.  Texas (Fifth Circuit) 
Texas, like Indiana and Florida, prohibits out-of-state firms from 
shipping alcohol directly to consumers, while allowing Texas wineries to 
do so.  In litigation challenging the constitutionality of the ban on direct 
shipment of out-of-state wine, the district court initially held that the 
Texas law violated the Commerce Clause and was not saved by the 
Twenty-first Amendment because it failed to serve the core concern of 
temperance.175  The Seventh Circuit then upheld Indiana’s ban, so the 
district court in Texas reconsidered its decision.176 
 
 169. Bainbridge, 311 F.3d at 1114-15. 
 170. Id. at 1115. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 1114, n. 15. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Tex. 2000), aff’d, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 675 
(S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 176. Id. at 675-77. 
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The court was critical of the Seventh Circuit decision in several 
respects.  First, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance upon the text and history 
of the Amendment was shaky because text and history were open to 
three different interpretations.177  Second, it failed to follow Supreme 
Court precedent which requires that discriminatory state regulation of 
alcohol must be closely related to a core concern of the Amendment.178  
Third, it found the ban on out-of-state direct shipment nondiscriminatory 
despite the fact that in-state sellers could ship directly to consumers, 
thereby gaining an economic advantage.179  The district court also noted, 
however, that recent Supreme Court decisions, though not directly 
applicable to the direct shipment issue, have expanded state authority at 
the expense of federal power under the Commerce Clause.180  In 
addition, some current Justices have written dissents in cases involving 
the Commerce Clause and Twenty-first Amendment; these dissents 
express dissatisfaction with the harmonizing principle of the past forty 
years and call for a return to the original literal interpretation of the 
Amendment, in which state power to regulate alcohol is not limited by 
the dormant Commerce Clause.181  Nevertheless, the district court 
concluded that the harmonizing principle remains binding precedent.182  
It therefore reaffirmed its decision that the Texas ban on direct shipment 
from out-of-state is discriminatory in violation of the Commerce Clause.  
The State had failed to show either how the economic advantage 
conferred upon in-state procedures served the core concerns of 
promoting temperance, revenue collection and orderly market 
conditions, or that those concerns could not be satisfied by 
nondiscriminatory alternatives.183  Finally, it granted an injunction 
against enforcing the ban on direct shipment from out of state, and 
deferred “to action by the legislature to repair the Alcoholic Beverage 
Code.”184  On appeal, the Fifth Circuit followed the District Court’s 
analysis and affirmed its decision in all respects.185 
 
 177. Id. at 680-82. 
 178. Id. at 682-94. 
 179. Id. at 685-86. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d. at 694. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 694-95. 
 184. Id. at 696. 
 185. Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2003).  Much of the panel’s opinion is 
devoted to deriding the state’s arguments, for example: “This is not even a close call . . . . The only 
complications in the adjudication arise from the Administrator’s mischaracterization of almost every 
relevant point – from the proper constitutional test to the nature of the case law to the gravamen of 
Plaintiffs’ legal position.”  Id. at 409. 
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D.  North Carolina (Fourth Circuit) 
North Carolina is another state that prohibits direct shipment to 
consumers from out-of-state vendors while permitting in-state wineries 
to do so.  In ensuing litigation, a federal district court followed the 
established analytical framework.186  It found that North Carolina’s law 
discriminates against out-of-state producers by allowing in-state 
wineries to ship directly to consumers while prohibiting out-of-state 
wineries from doing so.187  Rather than applying strict scrutiny to the 
proferred justifications for this discrimination, however, the court 
concluded this was direct discrimination against interstate commerce and 
there should be no inquiry into the State’s legitimate interests.188  The 
court then applied the established Twenty-first Amendment core concern 
analysis.  It stated that North Carolina had not proferred any reason at all 
for the favorable treatment afforded in-state wineries and thus concluded 
that North Carolina’s law is unconstitutional.189 
Like the district court in Texas, this court addressed the Seventh 
Circuit’s ruling to the contrary.  Rather than criticizing that ruling, 
however, the court distinguished the Indiana case on the facts.190  The 
Seventh Circuit found that Indiana’s law was not discriminatory 
because, although it prohibited direct shipment from out-of-state 
sources, it applied equally to in-state sources: all alcohol must pass 
through Indiana’s three-tiered system.191  The North Carolina law, on the 
other hand, favored in-state sources over out-of-state sources by 
allowing the former to ship directly, but not the latter.192  The district 
court enjoined the State from enforcing its ban on out-of-state direct 
shipment.193 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit followed the analytical framework 
 
 186. Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D. N.C. 2002) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 
325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court’s conclusion that North Carolina’s ABC 
laws unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce, but vacated its judgment insofar 
as it declared five statutes unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 471.  The district court noted that, in theory, the law permitted consumers to 
purchase wine directly from out-of-state producers, but the process for doing so was so cumbersome 
that it had a “chilling effect” on such purchases and thereby placed a “greater burden on goods 
produced out-of-state than on goods produced in-state.”  Id. 
 189. Id. at 472-74. 
 190. See id. at 474. 
 191. Id. at 474. 
 192. Beskind, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 474-75.  Oddly, the district court noted that “this case pits the 
Supreme Court . . . against the Seventh Circuit.” Id. at n. 12.  This suggests, not that Bridenbaugh is 
distinguishable, but that it applied the wrong legal standards. 
 193. Id. at 475. 
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established by the Supreme Court, rather than the “text and history” 
approach of the Seventh Circuit.194  It agreed with the district court that 
North Carolina’s law violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it 
discriminates against out-of-state wineries by subjecting their products 
to price mark-ups in the three-tiered system, while directly shipped 
domestic wine is free of such mark-ups.195  Moreover, two 
nondiscriminatory alternatives are available: terminate in-state direct 
shipment of wine, or permit direct shipment from out-of-state to a 
particular location to ensure tax collection.196  In addition, the appellate 
panel concluded that North Carolina’s decision to allow domestic 
wineries to bypass the three-tiered system and ship directly to consumers 
served no central concern of the Twenty-first Amendment and was 
simply “economic boosterism.”197 
With respect to the appropriate remedy, however, the panel held 
that the appropriate remedy was not to enjoin the ban on out-of-state 
direct shipment, but rather to enjoin in-state direct shipment.198  It 
reasoned that either remedy would end the discrimination and that the 
latter remedy would do less damage to the State’s legitimate Twenty-
first Amendment interest in maintaining the viability of its three-tiered 
regulatory system.199  It would do less damage, the panel asserted, 
because direct shipment of wine from out-of-state would pose a threat to 
the entire three-tiered system, whereas ending the exception for in-state 
direct shipment would pose no threat at all.200 
E.  Michigan (Sixth Circuit) 
Michigan is yet another state that prohibits out-of-state wineries 
from shipping directly to consumers in Michigan, but allows Michigan 
wineries to do so with minimal regulatory oversight.  In an unreported 
decision, the federal district court held that, regardless of the 
discrimination against out-of-state wineries, Michigan’s scheme ensured 
the collection of taxes from out-of-state producers (through the three-
tiered system) and discouraged sales to minors.201 
 
 194. Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 513-14 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 515-16. 
 197. Id. at 516-17. 
 198. Id. at 418-19. 
 199. Id. at 419. 
 200. Beskind, 325 F.3d at 517-20. 
 201. Heald v. Engler, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826, No. 00-CV-71438-DT (E.D. Mich 2001) 
(unreported), rev’d, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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The Sixth Circuit, however, concluded both that the discrimination 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause and that it failed to advance core 
state powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment.202  The 
discrimination lay in the facts that Michigan wineries could avoid price 
mark-ups of wholesalers and retailers whereas out-of-state wineries 
could not, licenses for out-of-state wineries to sell to wholesalers were 
far more expensive than licenses for Michigan wineries, and Michigan 
wineries had greater access to the Michigan market via direct 
shipment.203  The court further found no evidence that this 
discrimination actually promoted collection of taxes from out-of-state 
producers or prevented sales to minors in ways that cannot be 
accomplished by nondiscriminatory methods.204 
F.  New York 
A federal district court in New York has ruled that New York’s 
prohibition against direct shipment from out-of-state alcohol 
discriminates against interstate commerce because in-state wineries are 
allowed to do so, thus requiring all out-of-state wines to pass through 
New York’s three-tier system while direct shipment of in-state wine 
bypasses most, if not all, of the three-tier system.205  Turning to the issue 
whether such discrimination is nevertheless saved by the Twenty-first 
Amendment, the court found that the express purpose of allowing in-
state wineries to ship directly to consumers was to confer an economic 
benefit on them, which is not a central concern of the Amendment.206  
As to the central concern of temperance (specifically, prohibiting sales 
to minors), this concern can be protected by nondiscriminatory 
alternatives such as licensing and regulating out-of-state wineries.207  
New York also contended that the ban on direct shipping from out-of-
state was needed to prevent tax evasion, but the court found that the 
State had failed to prove that taxes on out-of-state sales could not be 
collected by nondiscriminatory means.208  The court simply ignored the 
Seventh Circuit ruling, other than to mention it.209 
 
 202. Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2003), reh’d denied, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 23001 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 2003). 
 203. Id. at 6-7, 19. 
 204. Id. at 26. 
 205. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 144-47 (S.D. N.Y. 2002). 
 206. Id. at 148. 
 207. Id. at 148-9. 
 208. Id. at 145-50.  The court also expressed doubt that raising revenue was a central concern 
of the Twenty-first Amendment.  Id. 
 209. Id. at 141. 
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As to the appropriate remedy, the State urged that the court should 
enjoin in-state direct shipment and plaintiffs contended the ban on out-
of-state direct shipment should be lifted.  The court indicated the latter 
was likely the more appropriate remedy because the legislature had 
shown some preference for direct shipment and banning in-state direct 
shipment would harm New York wineries.210 
G.  Virginia 
Virginia is another state that, until now, has permitted in-state direct 
shipment of wine while prohibiting direct shipment from out-of-state.  A 
federal district court concluded Virginia’s law is “the very definition of a 
facially discriminatory law.”211  It also ruled that the State had failed to 
prove that there are “no other nondiscriminatory means of enforcing 
their legitimate interests.”212 
This court sharply criticized the ruling of the Seventh Circuit as 
“improperly decided because it does not rely upon the established 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis.”213  As to remedy, the court 
declined to enjoin the provision permitting Virginia producers to ship 
directly to consumers, and instead lifted the ban on direct shipping from 
out-of-state.214  This decision was appealed, but the appeal is moot.  New 
Virginia legislation now permits out-of-state wineries and retailers to 
ship directly to consumers in Virginia, subject to Virginia taxes and 
regulation.215 
 
 210. Id. at 152-3. 
 211. Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 407 (E.D. Va. 2002) (adopting the Report and 
Recommendations of Magistrate Judge). 
 212. Id. at 409. 
 213. Id. at 408.  The district court also asserted, contrary to the Seventh Circuit, that the text of 
the Twenty-first Amendment does not unambiguously afford States unfettered control over 
importation of alcohol.  Id. at 410. 
 214. Id. at 449-50. 
 215. Lynn Alley & Dana Nigro, Appeals Court Rules North Carolina Must Change 
Unconstitutional Wine-Shipping Laws, WINE SPECTATOR (April 15, 2003), available at 
http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Daily/News/0,1145,2038,00.html. 
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VI.  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DIRECT SHIPMENT CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONTROVERSY 
The above review of the direct shipment litigation reveals that the 
issue presented is a strong candidate for review by the Supreme Court.216  
First, there is a conflict of opinion, particularly between the Seventh, 
Eleventh, Fifth, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, over this question: what is 
the proper analytical framework for resolving clashes between the 
dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment?  Second, 
this is an important issue that transcends the immediate direct-shipment 
controversy because the Court has, for seventy years in various contexts, 
struggled to define the proper relationship between the dormant 
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment.  Third, if the Court 
were to reaffirm its established principle that these two provisions must 
be harmonized, resolution of the direct shipment issue will provide the 
Court with an opportunity to clarify two unanswered questions: (1) what 
are the core powers reserved to the states by the Twenty-first 
Amendment; (2) what is the nature of a state’s burden to show that a law 
is closely related to such a reserved power?  If the Court were to grant 
review, it cannot be predicted with certainty how the Court would rule, 
but careful analysis of these issues indicates that the Court would likely 
rule that discriminatory direct shipment laws are unconstitutional. 
A.  The Proper Analytical Framework for Resolving Clashes between the 
Dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment 
For the past forty years, the Supreme Court has hewed to the 
principle that the Twenty-first Amendment did not repeal the Commerce 
Clause and, when the two are in conflict, they should be harmonized.  
With respect to the express provisions of the Commerce Clause, 
conferring upon Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, 
this is an attractive proposition because nothing in the text or history of 
the Amendment suggests that it was intended to eliminate congressional 
authority to regulate interstate commerce in alcohol.  The literal text of 
Section two might support such an interpretation, for it elevates state 
alcohol regulation to the level of constitutional requirement, 
unchangeable by Congress, by providing that any act in violation of state 
 
 216. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a).  Supreme Court rules specify that one consideration to be 
considered in deciding to grant a writ of certiorari is: “When a United States court of appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the 
same matter . . . .”  Id. (listing the proper considerations governing review on writ of certiorari). 
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law is prohibited.217  The text does not, however, state explicitly that the 
preexisting congressional authority over all forms of interstate 
commerce is repealed in the area of alcohol.  If that were so, the entire 
vast body of federal alcohol regulation is unconstitutional, a “patently 
bizarre” notion, as the Court put it.218 
The harmonization principle is somewhat less attractive, however, 
with respect to the dormant Commerce Clause.  The Commerce Clause 
does not expressly provide that state laws which discriminate against 
out-of-state products or that unreasonably burden interstate commerce 
are unconstitutional.  Thus, there is some force to the argument that 
when the express terms of Section two collide with non-textual, 
judicially-created rules designed to preserve the intent of the Commerce 
Clause, the express terms must prevail because they have greater 
legitimacy.  The counter to this argument is that the Court throughout 
our constitutional history has insisted, and rightly so, that there must be 
a judicial safeguard, independent of the will of any particular majority, 
against the sort of economic warfare experienced under the Articles of 
Confederation.  The danger of such warfare is no less present in the area 
of alcohol than in any other commercial area.  In any event, the Court 
has already abandoned the notion that Section two abrogated judicial 
authority to interpret and enforce the Commerce Clause, so an abrupt 
return to that notion seems highly unlikely. 
A more limited form of the argument that Section two abrogated 
the dormant Commerce Clause is that it did so with respect to the 
specific commercial activity at which Section two was aimed: alcohol 
imports.  This appears to be the view of the Seventh Circuit, and its 
analysis warrants close attention.  That panel asserted, not only does the 
plain language of Section two prohibit any act in violation of state law 
concerning “importation;” it also is aimed at precisely the problem direct 
shipping laws were designed to eliminate: reverse discrimination.  As 
the history prior to adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment 
demonstrates, Supreme Court rulings left states with the authority to 
regulate domestic alcohol commerce but not to regulate importation of 
alcohol in its original package.  This created reverse discrimination in 
which a state’s domestic industry was at an economic disadvantage 
because it was regulated as the state saw fit, but imports were not.  In the 
Seventh Circuit’s view, Section two was meant to remedy this precise 
problem by abrogating the judicial decisions that had created this 
 
 217. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 218. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp, 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964). 
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disparity and giving states power to level the playing field by subjecting 
imported alcohol to state regulation. 
Other courts have criticized the Seventh Circuit’s finding that 
Indiana’s direct shipment law is not discriminatory.  At first glance, this 
criticism seems warranted because that law plainly allowed Indiana 
sellers to ship directly to consumers, but prohibited out-of-state sellers 
from doing so.  This criticism, however, misses the Seventh Circuit’s 
point: laws prohibiting direct shipment of imports are not discriminatory 
in light of the history that animated Section two, which is that it was 
needed to eliminate discrimination against a state’s own alcohol 
industry.  To this point, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is on the mark. 
The flaw in the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, however, is that the 
current direct shipment controversy does not involve the reverse 
discrimination at which Section two was aimed.  Indeed, the state laws 
that are at issue in the current litigation are precisely the opposite.  They 
are laws that confer an economic advantage on a state’s domestic wine 
industry by allowing it to direct-ship and banning direct shipment by 
out-of-state competitors.  It seems highly unlikely, therefore, that the 
Supreme Court will accept even this limited form of a “text and history” 
analysis, because such analysis is inapplicable to these cases.  If that is 
so, no good reason appears why the Court should depart from its 
established precedent: when a state law discriminates against out-of-state 
products because of their geographical origin, it violates the Commerce 
Clause unless it is closely related to one of the powers reserved to the 
states by Section two of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
B.  Powers Reserved to the States by Section Two of the Twenty-first 
Amendment 
The Supreme Court has not yet made clear what powers are 
reserved to the states by Section two of the Twenty-first Amendment, 
although it has made clear that conferring economic advantage upon 
domestic industry by discouraging competition from outside a state is 
not one of them.219  Section two tracks the text of the Webb-Kenyon Act, 
so it is likely the Court would look to the purposes of that Act for 
guidance in defining the central concerns of Section two.  Above all, it 
was the Prohibition Movement that won passage of that Act, so 
promotion of temperance would seem to be a central concern of Section 
two.  In this context, temperance would be defined as moderation in 
 
 219. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984). 
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consumption of alcohol, or total abstinence. 
A plurality opinion of the Court has suggested that, in addition to 
temperance, the core of state power under Section two includes 
“ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue.”220  This 
plurality opinion stated that “ensuring orderly market conditions” 
includes “the power to control shipments of liquor during their passage 
through their territory and to take steps to prevent unlawful diversion of 
alcohol into a State’s market.”221  Raising revenue means collecting 
taxes on alcohol.  Whether or not a majority of the Court will ultimately 
agree with this position, both these powers are strong candidates for 
being viewed as central concerns of Section two. 
The historical context in which Section two was ratified suggests 
another central concern.  In Rhodes v. Iowa, the Supreme Court held that 
Prohibition states had no power to prohibit producers in other states 
from shipping alcohol directly to consumers.222  The Webb-Kenyon Act 
abrogated that decision by providing that importation of alcohol into a 
state in violation of state law is prohibited.223  Since Section two tracks 
the language of that Act, the Court might well conclude that preventing 
direct shipment from out-of-state vendors to consumers in violation of 
state law is a central concern of section 2. 
C.  A State’s Burden to Show that a Prohibition is Closely Related to a 
Power Reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment 
The above analysis suggests four plausible central concerns of 
Section two: promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, 
raising revenue, and preventing direct shipment to consumers.  When the 
Court held that a discriminatory state law must be “closely related” to a 
central concern of Section two, it did not define what it meant by 
“closely related” because it concluded the state’s proferred concern was 
not a central concern of Section two to begin with.224  Thus, the nature of 
a state’s burden to show that discriminatory alcohol regulation is 
“closely related” to a central concern of the Twenty-first Amendment 
remains an open question. 
It is highly unlikely the Court would rule that a state need only 
assert that such a law is closely related to a central concern and that such 
 
 220. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1986). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 13 (1989); see also supra notes 51-59 and 
accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 45-70 and accompanying text. 
 224. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 322. 
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an assertion must be accepted at face value by a court, for that would 
provide no meaningful judicial review of a state’s proferred central 
concern.  In order to have meaningful judicial review, a state must at 
least prove that its discriminatory law actually promotes its proferred 
central concern.  A closer question is whether a State must also prove 
that its concern cannot be met by available nondiscriminatory means.  If 
it must, then a discriminatory state law that violates the Commerce 
Clause because nondiscriminatory alternatives are available is a fortiori 
not closely related to a central concern of Section two.  For this reason, 
the Court might be reluctant to impose this burden on a state; it might be 
impossible to prove that a discriminatory state law is closely related to a 
central concern of Section two, thus arguably vitiating the shelter 
afforded States by section 2. On the other hand, a discriminatory state 
law that violates the Commerce Clause amounts to economic 
protectionism by definition; and economic protectionism is not a power 
reserved to the states by Section two.  Thus, the Court likely will 
conclude that a State must also prove that no nondiscriminatory methods 
are available.  Alternatively, since negatives are extremely difficult to 
prove, the Court might conclude the burden is on the plaintiff to prove 
that a nondiscriminatory method is available. 
D.  The Direct Shipment Issue 
1. Does the Ban on Direct Shipment from Out-of-State Violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause? 
Assuming that the Court abides by its settled precedent, as is likely, 
then the first issue it will consider in a direct shipment case is whether a 
state law that permits in-state producers to ship wine directly to 
consumers but prohibits out-of-state vendors from doing so 
discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  The recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
discussed in Part IV makes clear that only state laws that place out-of-
state products at an economic disadvantage due to their geographic 
origin entail the sort of discrimination that is subject to strict scrutiny.  
These state laws almost certainly meet that description; they prohibit 
direct shipment only of wine that would come from out-of-state.  The 
counter argument is that such laws merely ensure that all wine, whether 
produced in or out of state, passes through a state’s three-tiered 
regulatory scheme.  This argument, however, ignores a crucial fact: 
direct shipment from an in-state winery does not pass through the three-
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tiered system.  It bypasses both the wholesale and retail tiers, avoiding 
price markups at both those levels.  Out-of-state wine, on the other hand, 
must pass through both levels, subjecting it to the economic 
disadvantage of price markups. 
If these laws place out-of-state wine producers at an economic 
disadvantage because of the geographical origin of their product, the 
Court would face the question whether the state’s proferred justifications 
are legitimate state interests.  The promotion of a state’s domestic 
industry by affording it a means of trade prohibited to out-of-state 
interests is not legitimate because that is economic protectionism.  Other 
proferred justifications are legitimate: promoting temperance by 
preventing minors from purchasing alcohol, and raising revenue by 
collecting taxes on alcohol. 
The next question is whether direct shipment laws serve either of 
these interests.  This is an empirical (factual) inquiry.  As to purchase of 
wine by minors, the ban on direct shipment from out-of-state serves this 
interest because minors must attempt to purchase through licensed 
retailers, who can document their ages and refuse to sell, or be 
sanctioned for failing to do so. This same interest, however, can be 
served by nondiscriminatory alternatives, as demonstrated by in-state 
direct shipment.  Just as in-state direct shippers can be licensed and be 
required to obtain an adult signature before products are delivered, so 
can a state license out-of-state vendors as a condition of direct shipment 
sales and require an adult signature before delivery. 
Concerning collection of taxes to raise revenue, the ban on out-of-
state direct shipment serves this interest by requiring producers to sell to 
licensed wholesalers who must collect and remit state taxes, and who in 
turn sell to retailers, who must also collect and remit state taxes. The 
next issue is whether this interest can be adequately served by 
nondiscriminatory means.  One nondiscriminatory method is, as with 
preventing purchase by minors, licensing out-of-state vendors as a 
condition of direct shipping; such vendors could, as an additional 
condition, be required to collect and remit state taxes now collected by 
wholesalers and retailers. states will have an uphill battle to prove that 
this nondiscriminatory method of raising revenue is not an adequate 
alternative to the current discriminatory system.225 
 
 225. See, e.g., Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1115 (11th Cir. 2002).  There the court 
stated, “[a]fter all, in-state wineries are taxed directly, and this alternative therefore appears to be a 
viable substitute to the three-tier taxation scheme.  So why can’t out-of-state firms be taxed directly, 
just like in-state wineries?”  Id. 
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2. Is the Ban on Direct Shipment from Out-of-State Closely 
Related to Powers Reserved to the States by the Twenty-first 
Amendment? 
If the Court were to conclude, as seems likely, that state laws 
banning direct shipment of alcohol from out-of-state while permitting in-
state direct shipment of wine violate the dormant Commerce Clause, the 
next issue would be whether such laws are closely related to powers 
reserved to the states by Section two of the Twenty-first Amendment.  
One such power, or central concern, certainly would be promoting 
temperance, particularly preventing minors from purchasing alcohol.  It 
is a plausible argument that the ban on direct shipment meets this 
concern because it prevents minors from purchasing alcohol over the 
Internet or by calling a toll-free number.  The court is likely to conclude, 
however, that the state’s burden is greater than this: it must also prove 
that this concern will not be adequately served by available 
nondiscriminatory methods, lest the Twenty-first Amendment become a 
shield for economic protectionism.  As discussed above, a 
nondiscriminatory method of satisfying this concern is available: States 
can license out-of-state sellers for direct shipment and require an adult 
signature upon arrival.  Thus, the ban on direct shipment is probably not 
closely related to preventing sales to minors. 
Another possible central concern of Section two is ensuring orderly 
markets, defined as controlling the shipment of alcohol within a state 
and to prevent unlawful diversion of alcohol into a state’s market.  As 
with temperance, the ban on direct shipment meets this concern by 
channeling all imports through the tightly regulated three-tier system.  A 
nondiscriminatory method for meeting this concern is available, 
however.  A state can license out-of-state vendors as a condition of 
being permitted to engage in direct shipment.  Requiring them to submit 
reports and to collect and remit taxes will provide the means to monitor 
direct shipments.  This point leads directly to a third possible central 
concern: raising revenue.  Here the analysis of whether the ban on direct 
shipment is closely related to raising revenue is indistinguishable from 
the analysis of whether such a ban survives strict scrutiny under the 
Commerce Clause: it must actually serve this interest and there must be 
no available nondiscriminatory alternatives.  As discussed above, 
although the ban serves this interest, a nondiscriminatory alternative is 
available: require licensed out-of-state wineries to collect and remit 
taxes. 
A final central concern of Section two, supported by its historical 
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context, is to end the reverse discrimination that occurred when states, 
although they had the power to prohibit the sale or transportation of 
domestically-produced alcohol, had no power to prohibit the direct 
shipment of alcohol produced out-of-state.  If a state chose to prohibit 
direct shipment from in-state sources, then a ban on direct shipment 
from out-of-state would be closely related to this concern because it 
would prevent reverse discrimination against the state’s own industry 
and it would be the only way to do so.  In states that permit in-state 
direct shipment, however, the ban on direct shipment from out-of-state is 
not closely related to this concern because the concern is not present at 
all.  There is no reverse discrimination against the state’s own industry.  
Instead, the state is discriminating against out-of-state interests. 
This analysis indicates that, if the Supreme Court grants review in a 
direct shipment case, it will probably adhere to its established precedent 
concerning the relationship between the dormant Commerce Clause and 
Section two of the Twenty-first Amendment.  In so doing, it is likely to 
conclude that state laws banning direct shipment of alcohol from out-of-
state while permitting in-state direct shipment of wine are 
unconstitutional.  They discriminate against interstate commerce in 
violation of the Commerce Clause, and they are not closely related to 
any of the powers reserved to the states by the Twenty-first Amendment. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
What should a legislature do when faced with the prospect that one 
of its laws is probably unconstitutional?  One option is to do nothing in 
the hope that nothing will happen.  This approach will almost certainly 
fail with respect to direct shipment laws, because the litigation is 
burgeoning and unlikely to stop until the Supreme Court hands down a 
definitive ruling.  A second option is to wait until the state is sued and 
hope its law is held to be valid.  That outcome is certainly possible 
because the issue is in some respects a close issue.  The more likely 
result, however, is that the law will be held invalid, and then a federal 
court will impose a remedy.  Such a remedy will be a blunt instrument: 
the court will either enjoin in-state direct shipment of wine or, as is more 
likely, enjoin the ban on direct shipment of wine from out-of-state.  If 
the former occurs, it will frustrate the state’s policy of encouraging its 
domestic industry.  If the latter occurs, imports would flow into the state 
free of state regulation.  The state would have no system in place to 
assure, for example, that applicable taxes are collected and remitted.  
Thus, it would either have to tolerate this situation or scramble to enact 
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legislation in a hasty manner that might result in poor legislation. 
A final alternative available to states that have discriminatory direct 
shipping laws is to repeal the ban on direct shipment of wine from out-
of-state sources and enact legislation to regulate such direct shipment.  
Such a solution will serve several legitimate state interests.  First, it will 
continue to permit in-state direct shipment of wine so as to encourage a 
state’s domestic wine industry.  Second, it would prevent minors from 
using direct shipment to make illegal purchases.  Such legislation could 
require out-of-state vendors to obtain a license for a modest fee to ship 
limited amounts of wine directly to consumers, to collect and remit 
applicable state taxes, and to submit reports of such shipments.  It could 
also provide that a carrier that delivers such a shipment must obtain the 
signature of an adult when the product is delivered.  The system should 
be designed in such a way that it is not so cumbersome that out-of-state 
vendors are discouraged from applying for a license.  Third, it would 
create a new market in which states could gain additional revenue.  
Finally, this approach will allow these states to craft legislative solutions 
that are responsive to their own local interests without having reform 
imposed upon them by a court.  Thus, states that have discriminatory 
direct shipment laws should give serious consideration to enacting such 
legislation. 
